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Dirty Money: An Analysis of New Jersey’s 
Bail Source Statute and State v. Wr ght
* All views expressed in this article are the author’s alone, not 
necessarily those of the New Jersey Attorney General, nor the 
New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the New Jersey Constitution, all criminal de-fendants are entitled to pre-trial release if secured by sufficient bail to ensure their presence at all subsequent court appearances.1 Traditionally, a 
defendant or a close family member pledges the family nest 
egg or offers the family home as collateral for their loved one’s 
pre-trial release.2 If the defendant 
fails to appear for court, that col-
lateral, i.e., money or house, will be 
forfeited. Such a bail arrangement is 
often effective in guaranteeing a de-
fendant’s appearance in court.3
Yet too often criminal defen-
dants, especially alleged drug traf-
fickers and gang members who lack 
lawful means of support, pledge 
thousands of dollars for bail money 
that is derived from criminal activ-
ity.4 In other cases, some shadowy 
figure with little or no meaningful 
connection to the defendant will 
come forward with the requisite bail 
money, usually in exchange for a cut 
of the criminal proceeds.5 The use of proceeds stemming from 
illegal activities, pledged by either the defendant or one of his 
cohorts, defeats the purpose of bail.6 When a criminal defen-
dant’s liberty is secured by illegal proceeds, he has far less of 
an incentive to appear for trial because the loss of this money 
can be seen as the cost of doing business.7
To combat this problem, the New Jersey Legislature re-
vised three bail statutes in 2007. These revisions provided for 
the increased scrutiny of bail arrangements by trial courts and 
prosecutors to determine the sufficiency and reliability of both 
the bail pledged and those who pledged it.8 Accordingly, the law 
now allows for court-ordered hearings to examine the source of 
bail money,9 which can provide valuable information about the 
motivations for a defendant to appear.10 The Legislature thus 
recognized that the fundamental purpose of bail could not be 
achieved if a defendant were free to post with ill-gotten gains or 
if the defendant has no legitimate relationship with, or respon-
sibility to, the person posting. Simply stated, the “bail set by a 
court is not a ransom which will allow a defendant to flee if he 
or she is able to afford it.”11
While these revised bail source inquiry statutes enhanced 
the capacity of the New Jersey legal system to combat the use 
of criminal proceeds as bail, the statute failed to articulate the 
procedural features of these bail source hearings.12 Instead, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court was tasked with adopting a set of 
“procedure[s] to determine the suf-
ficiency of bail.”13 This lack of di-
rection, coupled with the Court’s 
incomplete response,14 has resulted 
in confusion, a lack of uniformity, 
and disparate rules for conducting 
bail source hearings throughout the 
New Jersey trial courts. To date, 
there is only one available court de-
cision interpreting the bail source 
statute.15 This decision attempts to 
establish the burdens of parties to 
bail source hearings.16 Yet in doing 
so the Wright court made some 
fundamental missteps that have re-
sulted in a flawed interpretation of 
the statute.17
Part II of this article examines New Jersey’s bail source 
statute,18 as well as the New Jersey court rule governing bail 
source hearings19 Part III summarizes the facts and holding of 
Wright,20 and Part IV analyzes the case’s outcome.21 Part V sug-
gests a different framework for conducting bail source hearings 
in New Jersey. This article concludes in Part VI that the Leg-
islature should revise the bail source statute to formally assign 
the burdens of production and proof to the defendant in a bail 
source hearing and thus, in effect, legislatively overrule a sig-
nificant aspect of the Wright holding.
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II. NEW JERSEY’S BAIL SOURCE STATUTE
The original version of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-13 
was enacted on January 9, 2004 and permitted trial courts to in-
quire about the source of funds used for bail.22 These bail source 
hearings were deemed discretionary and enabled the courts to 
determine the relationship of the defendant to the person post-
ing bail, the defendant’s interest in ensuring that the bail is not 
forfeited, and whether the funds used to post bail were acquired 
through criminal conduct.23 The statute permitted courts to thus 
“examine, under oath or otherwise, any person who may possess 
relevant information” and allowed the courts to inquire into sev-
eral factors of persons posting cash and to question the source 
of money or property pledged to secure bail.24 The Legislature 
simultaneously passed a related statute that directed the New 
Jersey Supreme Court to adopt procedural rules for conducting 
bail source hearings.25
On June 1, 2007, the Legislature adopted an updated ver-
sion of §§ 2A:162-13 as part of a sweeping legislative initiative 
designed to provide law enforcement with tools to “combat the 
growing menace of street gangs in New Jersey.”26 Under the 
new law, a person charged with bail restrictions27 who posts 
cash bail or secures a bail bond must provide the prosecutor 
with relevant information about (1) the obligor; (2) the indem-
nifier or person posting cash bail; (3) the security offered; and 
(4) the source of the money or property used to post cash bail or 
secure the surety or bail bond.28 The law requires a criminal de-
fendant first to complete and submit a form detailing the source 
of their bail to the prosecutor.29 After reviewing the bail source 
form, the prosecutor may request a formal bail source hearing.30 
If the offense is a bail-restricted crime, the court shall conduct 
a bail source hearing; at the request of the prosecutor, the court 
will then issue an order either approving or rejecting the bail.31 
In cases where the defendant is charged with an offense that is 
not a bail-restricted crime, the trial court still has the discretion 
to conduct a bail source hearing if requested by the prosecutor.32 
The court may further conduct such a hearing at the request of 
the prosecutor if the individual is charged with an offense other 
than a bail-restricted crime and later posts cash bail or secures 
a bail bond.33
Under the statute, the court cannot issue an order approv-
ing the bail unless it is first satisfied with several issues.34 First, 
the court must find that the evidence adduced in the inquiry 
establishes the reliability of the source of funds used to post 
bail or security offered.35 Second, the relationship of the obli-
gor or person posting cash bail must be sufficient to ensure the 
defendant’s presence in court when required.36 Third, the court 
must believe that the funds used to post cash bail or secure a bail 
bond were not acquired through criminal or unlawful conduct.37
The most significant change from the 2004 statute to the 
current version is the transfer of discretion from the courts to the 
prosecutor in determining whether a bail source hearing should 
be held when a defendant has been charged with a crime with 
bail restrictions.38 By removing judicial discretion to deny a re-
quest for these hearings, the statute relieves prosecutors of the 
need to make an initial showing that the source of bail funds 
are suspect.39
Like the 2004 version, the revised bail source statute di-
rected the New Jersey Supreme Court to devise the procedural 
rules for bail source hearings.40 In assigning the court the task 
of determining hearing procedures, the revised statute failed to 
include any specific procedural rules of its own.41 On Septem-
ber 1, 2008, over one year after the revised statute became law, 
the Supreme Court issued a number of procedural rules for bail 
source hearings. However, those rules predominantly concerned 
time and notice requirements.42 The court rules provided that the 
state could request a bail source hearing either orally or in writ-
ing at any time prior to trial.43 If the defendant is still in custody 
at the time the hearing is requested, the rule requires that the de-
fendant remain in custody until further order of the court.44 If the 
defendant has been released prior to the state’s request for a bail 
source hearing, the rule holds the defendant’s bail until comple-
tion of the hearing.45 The rule summarizes the requirements of 
the bail source statute by instructing the court to make findings 
of fact regarding all aspects of the bail arrangement and to issue 
an order declaring the bail arrangement satisfactory or unsat-
isfactory.46 In the event of an unsatisfactory bail arrangement 
where the defendant has already been released, the defendant 
must be returned to custody and held until a sufficient arrange-
ment is produced.47 The rule neither addresses which party bears 
the burdens of proof or production nor holds which standard of 
proof is necessary to satisfy a bail source inquiry.48
III. NEW JERSEY V. WRIGHT
The absence of direction from both the Legislature and the 
state Supreme Court regarding the burdens of proof and persua-
sion in bail source hearings has caused confusion in New Jersey 
trial courts, as evidenced by the only published opinion on the 
issue, Wright.49 On June 16, 2008, defendant Jermaine Wright 
was arrested with a codefendant on first-degree drug posses-
sion charges, after they were allegedly caught in possession of 
almost one pound of cocaine.50 Making matters worse, Wright 
allegedly possessed the cocaine within a school zone and within 
500 feet of a public park.51 Bail was set in municipal court at 
$150,000, cash or bond.52 At the time of his arrest Wright was 
already free on $135,000 bail on an earlier, unrelated first de-
gree drug distribution charge.53
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On June 25, 2008, a bail hearing was conducted in the Su-
perior Court, Law Division, at which time the State requested 
that bail be increased, arguing that 
Wright was a considerable flight risk in 
light of the fact that he was facing two 
first degree drug possession charges 
and, if convicted on either, he faced a 
possible life sentence under the repeat 
drug offender sentencing statute.54 Bail 
was then increased to $200,000 cash 
or bond, and at that time the State re-
quested a bail source hearing.55
Wright and his codefendant were 
subsequently indicted on first, second 
and third degree drug possession counts 
and conspiracy.56
In anticipation of the source hear-
ing, the trial court issued a written 
opinion in the case, wherein the court 
identified that the applicable statute was 
silent on several important procedural 
aspects of the bail source hearing.57 In 
particular, the Wright decision noted 
that neither the statute, nor New Jersey 
Court Rule 3:26-8, “allocate the burden of proof or define the 
standard of proof.”58
A. BURDEN OF PROOF AT A BAIL SOURCE HEARING
The court began its analysis by examining general prin-
ciples of allocation of burdens of proof, surveying case law and 
determining that while neither the Legislature, nor the Supreme 
Court, articulated a burden of proof for bail source hearings, it 
is common for both the bodies to allow burden of proof stan-
dards to develop through case law.59 The Wright court then, 
after employing a multi-faceted analysis, determined that the 
State should have the burden of persuasion.60 In so concluding 
the Court in Wright reasoned that since the State was seeking 
to “overturn” defendant’s bail by claiming its source renders it 
insufficient, it was the party relying on a fact and thus has the 
burden of establishing it.61 In addition, the Court in Wright 62 
relying on State v. Zorillo63, reasoned that placing a burden of 
persuasion on criminal defendants would infringe on their state 
constitutional right to bail.64
B. BURDEN OF PRODUCTION
Although expressly rejecting the argument that because de-
fendant has better access to information about his bail arrange-
ment and therefore should bear the burden of persuasion, the 
Wright court determined this was an appropriate basis to shift 
the burden of production to defendant.65
In assigning the burden of production on the defendant the 
Wright court created a requirement that the State was first re-
quired to make a prima facie showing 
that the bail arrangement was insuffi-
cient or the proceeds tainted before the 
burden of production shifts to a defen-
dant.66 Although articulating that the 
showing by the State “should not be ex-
tremely difficult,” the Wright court did 
not specify what the State was required 
to show in order to obtain a bail source 
hearing.67 The court also made no dis-
tinction between bail-restricted cases 
and cases not charging crimes with bail 
restrictions.68
C. STANDARD OF PROOF
The Wright69 decision concluded 
by determining that the State has the 
ultimate burden of proving that a bail 
arrangement is insufficient to ensure a 
defendant’s appearance in court, and 
must do so by a preponderance of the 
evidence.70 In doing so, the Wright court 
relied on State v. Casavina,71 finding that since the State was 
seeking to deny bail, it must do so by a preponderance.72 The 
Wright court reasoned that since Casavina required the State to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant 
should not be eligible to participate in the ten percent option 
for bail, the State must also establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that a bail arrangement is insufficient to ensure a 
defendant’s presence at future court appearances.73
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE WRIGHT DECISION
The Wright decision begins on a faulty premise: in request-
ing a bail source hearing the State is not seeking to “overturn” 
the court’s order setting the amount of bail, nor attempting to 
“set aside an order already in place . . . .”74 The Wright court 
twice incorrectly reasoned that the State should have the burden 
of persuasion because it is seeking to overturn the bail already 
in place.75 The State in the Wright case did not challenge the 
$200,000 bail; rather the State sought a hearing to determine 
who was pledging defendant’s bail and whether the source of 
the bail proceeds was from illegal activity.76 These are two sepa-
rate proceedings and the request for a source hearing should not 
be viewed as a second bite at the apple to overturn the amount 
of bail. A defendant’s right to bail does not sweep so broadly as 
to allow a defendant to pledge money that is tainted.
The Wright court is 
overly cautious in its 
concern that placing 
the burden  
of persuasion on 
criminal defendants 
violates their state 
constitutional rights.
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The Wright court is overly cautious in its concern that plac-
ing the burden of persuasion on criminal defendants violates 
their state constitutional rights.77 The right to bail in New Jer-
sey is not absolute and has several conditions.78 This right is 
“clearly qualified by, among other limitations, compliance with 
the conditions of bail . . . .”79 The bail source hearing is not an 
encumbrance on the right to bail, but rather a condition of it. 
Similarly, defendants subject to source hearing requirements 
must demonstrate, by a modest level of proof, that their bail 
money is not derived from criminal activity.80 This demonstra-
tion is no more stringent a bail condition than others placed on 
defendants seeking pre-trial release.
Moreover, Wright’s reliance on the Rhode Island v. Zorillo 
court’s proposition that placing the burden of proof and produc-
tion on a criminal defendant violates that defendant’s consti-
tutional right to bail is unpersuasive.81 The terms of N.J.S.A. 
2A:162-13 are different from those of the Rhode Island statute 
that were declared unconstitutional in Zorillo.82 In addition, 
the New Jersey Constitution’s right to bail is quite different 
from Rhode Island’s. Unlike the New Jersey Constitution,83 the 
Rhode Island Constitution84 does not grant the right to bail to all 
criminal defendants.85 Rather, there are large classes of crimi-
nals not entitled to bail.86 There bail is a two-step process, where 
first, the state attempts to deny bail outright, and if unsuccessful, 
then requests a source hearing.87 The Zorillo court specifically 
found the state’s attempt to use the source hearing as a means of 
thwarting bail to be unconstitutional, due to the state’s attempt 
to deny bail outright.88 This endeavor was exacerbated by the 
high standard of proof that Rhode Island defendants had to meet 
to prove the legitimacy of their bail money.89
Zorillo illustrated that although the state shouldered the ini-
tial burden of proving a defendant ineligible for bail in phase 
one, it could effectively shirk this burden altogether by request-
ing a bail source hearing, thus transferring the burden to the 
defendant. As a result, the state’s actions were found unconsti-
tutional.90 In fact, Zorillo indicated that to avoid constitutional 
challenges, trial courts could inquire about the source of bail 
during the first phase of the bail proceeding, thereby eliminat-
ing the chance that the state would seek to evade its burden of 
proving the defendant ineligible for bail.91 The combination of 
bail availability to virtually all criminal defendants in New Jer-
sey, and the low standard of establishing untainted bail money, 
result in the proposed and constitutional framework set out infra 
Part V. Thus given the marked differences in the state constitu-
tional rights to bail in New Jersey and Rhode Island, the Wright 
court’s reliance on Zorillo is misplaced.
The Wright court’s analysis further unravels when it re-
lies on Casavina92 and cites federal bail law.93 Both Casavina 
and federal bail law contain presumptions regarding a defen-
dant’s right to bail or to the ten percent option for posting 
bail.94 Accordingly, the state or government must overcome 
these presumptions by a preponderance of the evidence. There 
is no presumption that all bail arrangements are sufficient or 
untainted. Therefore, the Wright court is incorrect in asserting 
that the state must provide, via a preponderance of the evidence, 
proof that the bail is tainted because no contrary presumption 
exists.95 Moreover, the fact that defendants have a state consti-
tutional right to bail does not change the calculus. Mr. Wright’s 
bail was set at $200,000; the state’s request for a source hearing 
did not unduly infringe on this right to bail, but instead simply 
ensures that the bail is untainted.96 Consequentially, the state 
should not bear the burden of proof.
The Wright decision correctly placed the burden of pro-
duction on defendant, because he is in a better position to more 
quickly produce records rather than waiting for bank and tax re-
cord subpoenas to be issued and returned. However, the Wright 
court made another fundamental misstep by grafting a separate 
condition onto the rule, requiring the state to make a prima 
facie showing,97 even in crimes with bail restrictions, before it 
can obtain a bail source hearing. While the court rule explicitly 
states that in crimes without bail restrictions the state “must 
demonstrate a reasonable and well grounded basis to warrant 
an inquiry by the court,” there is no similar provision for bail 
source hearings in crimes with bail restrictions.98 Rather, under 
both the statute and the court rule regarding crimes with bail 
restrictions, the state need only request a hearing and the court is 
required to conduct one.99 In Wright, the defendant was charged 
with a crime with bail restrictions, and although the state made a 
timely request for a bail source hearing, the court superimposed 
this requirement onto the court rule as a condition precedent to 
the granting of a hearing.100 Since neither the bail source statute 
nor the court rule governing bail source hearings requires such 
a showing by the state to be granted a hearing, the Wright court 
thus exceeded its authority and directly contradicted the statute.
V. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR CONDUCTING  
BAIL SOURCE HEARINGS IN NEW JERSEY COURTS
A criminal defendant is in a better position to shoulder the 
burdens of proof and persuasion at a bail source hearing, and 
should do so by a preponderance of the evidence.
The bail source statute appears to place the burden on a 
defendant to demonstrate that his bail money was law-
fully acquired.101 As written, the statute prohibits the 
court at the conclusion of the bail source inquiry from 
issuing an orderapproving the bail unless it is satisfied 
that the evidence adduced in the inquiry establishes the 
reliability of the source of the funds used to post bail 
or security offered, that the relationship of the obligor 
or person posting cash bail is sufficient to ensure the 
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defendant’s presence in court when required, and that 
the funds used to post cash bail or secure a bail bond 
were not acquired as a result of criminal or unlawful 
conduct.102
This language implies that the defendant bears the burden 
of proof. The defendant would introduce evidence establishing 
(1) the sufficiency of his relationship with the obligor, and (2) 
that his bail funds were not the fruits of criminal conduct.
It seems appropriate that the burdens of proof and persua-
sion are placed on defendants to demonstrate why their posted 
bail should be approved.103 The New Jersey Constitution does 
not outlaw the imposition of all burdens on defendants.104 Crim-
inal defendants are better able to shoulder these burdens be-
cause they know the source of their bail funds.105 In the interest 
of obtaining an expeditious yet informed determination by the 
court, the ultimate burden of persuasion should be borne by the 
defendant.106
In cases where the defendant is not charged with a crime 
with bail restrictions, and where the state must demonstrate 
a reasonable and well-grounded basis to warrant a hearing, it 
would be appropriate to impose a concomitant burden of both 
production and persuasion on the defendant once the state’s 
initial burden is met. Courts in both New York107 and Rhode 
Island108 impose this requirement. By placing the burden of pro-
duction on the defendant, the court avoids the potential delay of 
defendant’s release, which could occur upon adjournment for 
the state to conduct its own investigation.109 Far from being an 
unconstitutional burden, requiring a defendant to provide suf-
ficient information to the trial court to justify release gives the 
defendant an incentive to do so completely and accurately.110 
Trial courts are entitled to the most complete and accurate in-
formation available to make a proper determination regarding 
whether bail should be allowed.111
The New Jersey Legislature should amend thebail source 
statute and require criminal defendants to bear the burden of 
persuading trial courts, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the money or property posted as collateral is not the fruit of 
unlawful conduct. The preponderance of the evidence standard 
is reasonable and fair to both defendant and the state.112 Imple-
mentation of this standard will allow for an appropriate inquiry 
by the court, will satisfy prosecutors’ need to know the lawful-
ness of a bail’s source, and will be met by defendants with little 
difficulty
VI. CONCLUSION
New Jersey’s revised bail source statute is a promising step 
in ensuring that criminal defendants are not allowed to post the 
proceeds of criminal activity to secure their pre-trial release and 
that they have a real and meaningful relationships with the peo-
ple posting bail. However, the statute is incomplete. The current 
statute should be amended to assign the burdens of proof and 
production at bail source hearings to criminal defendants, and to 
require a showing by a preponderance of the evidence. Alterna-
tively, the New Jersey Supreme Court should revise its applica-
ble rules governing bail source hearings to assign these burdens 
to criminal defendants, who are best equipped to shoulder them. 
Without such affirmative statements by either the Legislature or 
the Supreme Court, trial courts may misinterpret the bail source 
statute, as demonstrated by the Wright decision.113 CLB
1 N.J. CONST. ART. I, § 11 (granting defendants the right to bail in non-
capital cases).
2 See id. (providing for pre-trial release based on “sufficient sureties”).
3 See New Jersey v. Simpson, 839 A.2d 896, 901 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2003). “It is difficult to conceive of a matter more central to the ad-
ministration of the criminal justice system than the appearance of defen-
dants before the court as the court requires.” Id.
4 See In re Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 846 F. Supp. 463, 475 
(E.D. Va. 1994) (explaining that “[c]ourts have frequently remarked 
on the fact the large sums of cash and drugs frequently go together”); 
see also United States v. Thomas, 913 F.2d 1111, 1115 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(citations omitted) (illustrating that “[t]he possession of unusually large 
amounts of cash . . . or the making of uncommonly large cash  
purchases . . . may be circumstantial evidence of drug trafficking”).
5 See United States v. DeMarchena, 330 F. Supp. 1223, 1225, 1227 
(S.D. Cal. 1971) (stating that after defendant was indicted for transporting 
over 2,000 pounds of marijuana into the United States, two unknown per-
sons approached a bail bondsman, tendered a greeting card box contain-
ing $55,000 in cash, and attempted to secure the defendant’s release from 
custody. After a bail source hearing, the court stated, “[a]t this time the 
court knows nothing of the $55,000 in the Hallmark card box, except that 
it came from someone who cared enough to send the very best. Whether 
this person cares about future court appearances of defendant is doubt-
ful”).
6 See New York v. Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1993) (reiterating that “[i]f the funds posted are the fruits of criminal or 
unlawful conduct, then a defendant may choose simply to forfeit the col-
lateral and flee. This is a small price to pay for the ‘privilege’ of reaping 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in illegal profits prior to apprehension”).
7 See New York v. McIntyre, 640 N.Y.S.2d 386, 390-91 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1996) (noting that bail arrangement violates public policy when “[n]
either defendant nor a close relative has put his own assets at risk” as the 
“prospect of loss to the third-party indemnitors in this case is not likely to 
provide incentive for defendant to return”).
8 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-12-14 (WEST 2007) (determining “[c]
rime with bail restrictions, that the court may “conduct an inquiry to de-
termine the reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail . . . [and] 
the relationship of the obligor or person posting cash bail to the defen-
dant. . . and that [t]he procedure to determine the sufficiency of bail shall 
be governed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court”).
9 See § 2A:162-13 (stating that when a person posts cash bail, the court 
may upon the request of the prosecutor conduct inquiries about the reli-
ability of the person offering bail).
10 See id., enabling trial courts to obtain all relevant information relating 
to the bail determination, which ensures the integrity of the judicial process.
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11 Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
12 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-12-14 (2010). These sections discuss 
the crimes that qualify for bail, the applicability of a court inquiry, and 
even the sufficiency of bail, but fail to fully address the burdens of par-
ties. Procedurally-wise, the statute primarily addresses what a prosecutor 
must do for a hearing. Id.
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-14 (2010)
14 See N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8 (2010) (expressing that unless a defendant is 
charged with a crime listed infra note 20, the “the State must demonstrate 
a reasonable and well grounded basis to warrant an inquiry by the court”).
15 New Jersey v. Wright, 980 A.2d 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2009).
16 Id.
17 See id. at 19 (stating that the defendant must disclose information 
regarding the source of their bail).
18 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-12-14 (2010).
19 N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8.
20 See Wright, 980 A.2d at 26 (holding that the “State bears the burden 
of persuasion that the bail does not satisfy the requirements”).
21 See infra part IV.
22 An earlier version of the 2004 statute, S-1322 introduced in the New 
Jersey Senate on March 14, 2002 by Senator Wayne R. Bryant, limited 
bail source hearings to defendants charged with drug offenses under 
Chapter 35 of the New Jersey Criminal Code.
23 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-13 (2010).
24 These factors include the character, background, and reputation of the 
person posting bail. See id.
25 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-14 (2010).
26 From the legislative history, it is apparent that that the Legislature 
wanted to give prosecutors this power to thwart gang members pledg-
ing bail with criminal proceeds and makes clear that courts would be 
required to conduct bail source hearings without any initial showing 
by prosecutors. See Assembly Approves Watson Coleman Anti-Street 
Gang Package, (May 22, 2006) available at http://vip.politickernj.com/
assembly-majority-leader-bonnie-watson-coleman-6 (“One such piece of 
legislation (A2987) would require an investigation into the source of bail 
money used in gang-related cases to determine if the funds came from 
a legitimate source or an illegitimate one, such as drug sales. The mea-
sure clarifies under which an investigation into the source of bail money 
would be required, including all first and second degree crimes, any crime 
involving a weapons offense and any crime involving alleged gang activ-
ity.”).
27 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-12 (2010) (enumerating the following 
crimes as being bail restricted: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual 
assault, robbery, carjacking, arson and related offenses, causing or risking 
widespread injury or damage, burglary, theft by extortion, endangering 
the welfare of a child, arrest, escape, corrupting or influencing a jury, pos-
session of weapons for unlawful purposes, weapons training for illegal 
activities, and soliciting or recruiting gang members).
28 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-13 (2010) (providing that when a de-
fendant “posts cash bail or secures a bail bond, the courtshall, upon 
the request of the prosecutor, conduct an inquiry to determine the 
reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail, the value and 
sufficiency of any security offered, the relationship of the obligor or 
person posting cash bail to the defendant and the defendant’s inter-
est in ensuring that the bail is not forfeited, and whether the funds used 
to post the cash bail or secure the bail bond were acquired as a result of 
criminal or unlawful conduct”).
29 See id. (noting pursuant to this inquiry, the court “may examine, 
under oath or otherwise, any person who may possess relevant informa-
tion,” and may inquire into any other relevant matters, including, inter 
alia, the “source of any money or property deposited by any obligor as 
security and whether such money or property constitutes the fruits of 
criminal or unlawful conduct”); see also N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8 (questioning 
“whether the funds used to post bail or secure the bail bond were acquired 
as a result of criminal or unlawful conduct”).





34 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-12-14 (2010) (stating that the court 
can examine a person with relevant information under oath; once the in-





38 Compare §1c (stating “a defendant may post bail in any combination 
of forms authorized in subsection b. of this section provided the court 
does not direct otherwise”) with § 2A:162-13 (specifying that “the court 
may, upon the request of the prosecutor, conduct an inquiry to determine 
the reliability of the obligor or person posting cash bail”); but see infra 
Parts III and IV (discussing Wright, which holds that the state must make 
a prima facie showing that the bail arrangement is tainted or otherwise 
unsatisfactory before a hearing will be granted, even for bail restricted 
crimes).
39 The legislative history makes it clear that the Legislature granted 
these powers to prosecutors to thwart gang members from pledging bail 
with criminal proceeds, and that courts would be required to conduct bail 
source hearings without any initial showing by prosecutors.
40 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-14 (2010).
41 See Bail Source/Sufficiency Hearings – Rule Recommendations – 
Publication for Comment at 1-2 Before the Criminal Practice Committee 
(2008) (statement of Honorable Edwin H. Stern) (waiting to amend the 
rules until Assembly Bill No, 2987 and Senate Bill No. 2012 were signed 
into law).
42 N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8 (noting that if a defendant fails to appear for 
his bail source hearing, bail will be revoked, forfeited, and the trial court 
is required to issue a bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See Bail Source/Sufficiency Hearings, supra note 45 (debating 
these critical issues vigorously, the Criminal Practice Committee could 
not reach a consensus and thus remained silent on the issues); see also 
WRIGHT, 980 A.2D at 20-21 (noting that the state Supreme Court declined 
to assign or explain the standard of proof).
49 WRIGHT, 980 A.2D at 17.




54 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(F) (WEST 2008); Wright, 980 A.2d at 19.
55 WRIGHT, 980 A.2D AT 19.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 19-21.
58 Id. at 20.
59 Id. at 21.
60 See id. at 20-22 (commenting on the analysis which included examin-
ing a party’s access to the proofs, considering the tradition that burden of 
establishing a fact is generally placed on the person relying thereon, and 
the comparative interests of the of the parties).
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61 WRIGHT, 980 A.2D at 23-25.
62 Id.
63 State v. Zorillo, 565 A.2d 1259 (R.I. 1989).
64 WRIGHT, 980 A.2D at 23-24.
65 Id. at 24-26.
66 Id. at 24-25.
67 Id. at 25.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 17.
70 WRIGHT, 980 A.2D at 26.
71 State v. Casavina, 394 A.2d 142 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
72 See N.J. CT R. 3:26-4 (2010) (“bail may be satisfied by the deposit 
in court of cash in the amount of ten-percent of the amount of bail fixed 
and defendant’s execution of a recognizance for the remaining ninety per-
cent”).
73 See Wright, 980 A.2d at 26 (citing New Jersey v. Casavina, 394 A.2d 
142 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)) (asserting that application can be 
disallowed only for “sound reasons” or with “sufficient findings specifi-
cally articulated by the judge”).
74 Id. at 22.
75 Id. at 22, 24.
76 Id. at 18. The statute mandates a hearing upon the prosecutor’s re-
quest for certain issues; once that request has been granted, the prosecu-
tion bears the burden of persuasion. Id. Therefore the State requested a 
hearing after the bail was increased from $150,000 to $200,000 based on 
their allegations that the defendant’s charges fell under the proscribed list 
of illegal activities. Id.
77 Id. at 22; see New Jersey v. Ramirez, 875 A.2d 1025, 1031 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (noting that the limitations on this constitu-
tional right to bail arise out of a concern for the public interest, which suf-
fers a grave injury when a defendant fails to appear for trial).
78 N.J. CT. R. 3:26-1(a) sets forth the standard for fixing bail, and pro-
vides that “the court may also impose terms or conditions appropriate 
to the defendant’s release including conditions . . . necessary to protect 
persons in the community.” N.J. CT. R. 3:26-6. A court is also authorized 
to order forfeiture of a defendant’s bail “[u]pon breach of a condition of a 
recognizance, the court on its own motion shall order forfeiture of the  
bail . . . the court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside if its enforce-
ment is not required in the interest of justice upon such conditions as it 
imposes.” Id.
79 New Jersey v. Simpson, 839 A.2d 896, 901 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2003).
80 See New Jersey v. Johnson, 294 A.2d 245, 252 (N.J. 1972) (noting 
that the imposition of a bail condition is a matter of judicial discretion, 
and that “discretion must be exercised reasonably, having in mind that the 
primary purpose of bail in this State is to insure presence of the accused 
at trial, and that the constitutional right to bail should not be unduly bur-
dened”).
81 Other than Wright, there are no other published opinions that rely on 
Zorillo for guidance on bail source standards. See Wright, 980 A.2d 17; 
see also Rhode Island v. Zorillo, 565 A.2d 1259 (R.I. 1989).
82 The statute at issue in Zorillo specifically states: “If, after hear-
ing, the party who has posted or is about to post bail or has furnished a 
fee, money or other consideration to another person who has posted or 
is about to post bail cannot establish to the satisfaction of the court by 
clear and convincing evidence that the source of money is from a legal 
enterprise the court need not accept the bail.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-13-23 
(1988).
83 The New Jersey Constitution only prohibits bail for those charged 
with capital crimes. But since the death penalty has sincebeen abolished 
in New Jersey as of December 2007, all defendants in New Jersey are en-
titled to bail. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:43-6(F) (WEST 2008).
84 R.I. CONST. ART. I, § 9. “All persons imprisoned ought to be bailed 
by sufficient surety, unless for offenses punishable by imprisonment 
for life or for offenses involving the use or threat of use of a dangerous 
weapon by one already convicted of such an offense or already convicted 
of an offense punishable by imprisonment for life or for an offense in-
volving the unlawful sale, distribution, or delivery of any controlled sub-
stance punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, when the proof 
of guilt is evident or the presumption great. Nothing in this section shall 
be construed to confer a right to bail, pending appeal of a conviction. The 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when 
in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety shall require it; nor ever 
without the authority of the general assembly.” Id.
85 See Fountaine v. Mullen, 366 A.2d 1138, 1142-43 (1976) (noting that 
trial courts in Rhode Island retain discretion as to whether a defendant 
should be granted bail).
86 See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9 (bail is not available for offenses “punish-
able by imprisonment for life, or for offenses involving the use or threat 
of use of a dangerous weapon by one already convicted of such an offense 
or already convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment for life, or 
for an offense involving the unlawful sale, distribution, manufacturer, de-
livery, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute or deliver 
any controlled substance or by possession or by a controlled substance 
punishable by imprisonment for ten (10) years or more, when the proof of 
guilt is evident or the presumption great”).
87 Zorillo, 565 A.2d at 1261.
88 Id.
89 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-13-23 (1988) (requiring defendants to prove 
“by clear and convincing evidence that the source of money is from a 
legal enterprise”).
90 Zorillo, 565 A.2d at 1261.
91 Id.
92 In Casavina, 394 A.2d 142 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978), the Ap-
pellate Division found that a trial court has discretion to deny a defendant 
a ten percent cash option for bail when it deemed the defendant a flight 
risk. 394 A.2d at 143-44. The opinion states that while all defendants are 
presumed eligible for a ten percent cash option, the state bears the burden 
of proving a defendant’s ineligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Id. at 144.
93 Wright, 980 A.2d at 23.
94 See generally Wright, 980 A.2d at 23 (referencing how the “State 
bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence why a de-
fendant should be denied a ten percent option on bail”).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 19.
97 This standard is murky. The Wright court set a seemingly low stan-
dard but left it undefined, stating only that the standard “should not be 
extremely difficult” for the State to meet it. Id. at 25-26.
98 N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8(b).
99 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-12 (WEST 2007); N.J. CT. R. 3:26-8(b).
100 Wright, 980 A.2d at 25.
101 § 2A:162-13.
102 Id.
103 Burdens in collateral matters are often placed on a criminal defen-
dant; for example, the burden of proving affirmative defenses, such as 
duress or entrapment, fall upon criminal defendants in New Jersey. § 
2C:1-13(C).
104 For example, both the Appellate Division and the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey have ruled that a defendant who violates the conditions of his 
bail must bear the burden of demonstrating why that bail should not be 
forfeited. New Jersey v. Korecky, 777 A.2d 927, 933 (N.J. 2001); Ramirez, 
875 A.2d at 1031-32.
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105 See Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (suggesting that “the defendant is 
uniquely suited to know the source of the bail funds [and] [i]f the pros-
ecution were required to investigate the source of any and all funds and/
or property posted, the court would be required to grant the people an 
adjournment to conduct the investigation, thereby delaying defendant’s 
release and frustrating the purpose of bail”).
106 See J.E. ex rel G.E. v. New Jersey, 622 A.2d 227, 235-36 (N.J. 1993) 
(noting that the Court “generally [has] imposed the burdens of persuasion 
and production on the party best able to satisfy those burdens.”); see also 
Romano v. Kimmelman, 474 A.2d 1, 14 (N.J. 1984) (holding “clear and 
convincing proof ” is required to admit a breathalyzer test).
107 McIntyre, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88; see Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 545-
46 (explaining the burden of production for records relating to bail).
108 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-13-23 (1988).
109 Id.
110 A court has “the right and the duty to satisfy itself that there is more 
than just a financial assurance that a bailed defendant will appear in court 
when required.” DeMarchena, 330 F. Supp. at 1226.
111 Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
112 See id. (noting that the preponderance of the evidence standard has 
been employed in New York state courts for over fifteen years, thus dem-
onstrating its reasonableness and fairness to both the defendant and the 
state). 
113 See Wright, 980 A.2d at 17.
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